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Abstract 
 
The main objective of this research is to make an assessment of the symmetry/asymmetry of 
underlying macroeconomic shocks in the Eurasia region. A model is developed to distinguish 
structural global supply shocks, regional supply shocks, and domestic supply shocks using a 
reduced-form structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR). Empirical results reveal that the 
correlation between domestic and regional shocks, as well as between domestic and global 
shocks, are clearly divided into two groups of countries: (i) domestic (country-specific) supply 
shocks are more correlated with global shocks in the European part of the region (Armenia, 
Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine; with the exception of Mongolia here); and (ii) domestic shocks 
are mostly correlated with regional shocks in the Central Asian part of the region (Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan; with the exception of 
Moldova here). This has implications for the Chinese economy in the region. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A global economic crises seems to be unavoidable, trade protectionism is proliferating – at 
least currently in some developed countries – and globalisation is slowing down (Jian, 2017). 
It is difficult to say that developed countries are opposing globalisation, but at the same time, 
the previous world economic order cannot meet their needs and new rules are necessary to deal 
with their interests. However, developed countries cannot determine the system, or how the 
system is regulated, alone. This is because globalisation in the current era requires a fair and 
equitable system of trade that provides an active role for developing countries. The 
development of regional and global partnerships such as the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and ASEAN Australia New Zealand Free 
Trade Area (AANZFTA) are examples of such cooperation between the developed and 
developing worlds. In this context, Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership and China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative are two instances of international cooperation that could respond to the 
changing international economic environment (Lukin, 2016). 
 
The emergence of economic integration in a number of global regions has encouraged tighter 
economic cooperation in Eurasia. This region is receiving increasing attention as it is 
considered to be a bridge between East and West. It is necessary to identify how the economies 
of Eurasia respond to shocks from the region and from the world.  
 
                                                          
1 This paper has been presented in the ECOMOD Conference, Azores, Portugal during 10-12 July 2019. It is part 
of the “Eurasian Integration Index” project at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute.  
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In this paper, the US economy represents the global economy and the regional economy is 
represented by the Chinese economy, due to their significant impact on other countries. It is 
important to realise whether Eurasian economies are more influenced by the global economy 
or the regional economy, in terms of macroeconomic shocks.  
 
Regionalisation has emerged as a fundamental trend in the development of global order. 
Regionalisation also involves the establishing of new forms of interaction between states, 
especially when they comprise the world’s macro regions. An increasing  number of countries 
are attempting to form a stable system of cooperation with their neighbours. This is helpful in 
enhancing domestic potential and in facilitating solutions to regional problems. Regionalisation 
has taken various forms, including trade agreements, custom unions, alignment of regulatory 
systems, and monetary arrangements. In the Eurasia region, such arrangements have to some 
extent come about within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Eurasian Economic 
Space, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Alimov, 2018).  
 
China has recently developed its relations with neighbouring countries and is trying to increase 
its influence on these countries through the Belt and Road Initiative. The rise of the Chinese 
economy could potentially create a Yuan bloc in the region. The phrase ‘Yuan bloc’ implies a 
concentration of trade and investment relations in Eurasia rather than the role of the currency 
as part of a common monetary policy in the region. These two interpretations of ‘Yuan bloc’ 
are not necessarily in competition, as one may cause the other (Frankel, 1994). 
 
Most of the countries in Eurasia are transitional economies that changed from central planning 
to free markets after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. However, they are diverse in 
terms of culture, for example, some countries are closer to Europe and others, like the Central 
Asian countries, are closer to China. The region is prone to shocks from the global economy – 
as shown by US attempts to assert dominance over the Eastern European part of the region – 
and also from the regional economy – as shown by Chinese attempts to influence the region. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the reaction of these economies to supply shocks from 
the world and from the region.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature by evaluating the economic security of the region and 
by assessing political analyses that have been recorded by Kuchins (2018), Karaganov (2018), 
and Li (2018).  
 
2. Literature review 
 
There is a large body of political analysis of Eurasian countries, but only a few authors pay 
respect to various aspects of economic integration. For example, Vinokurov (2017) examined 
the current state of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with in terms of economic 
integration, showing that the EAEU has not been a success story and also that the integration 
progress has slowed down, despite initially rapid advancement. However, there have been some 
achievements. The EAEU is widely viewed as a functioning customs union, although not as a 
general unit of regional economic integration.  
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Hartwell (2013) examined the challenges for deeper and broader integration in the Eurasia 
region and concluded that greater integration would only be useful for all economies if it is 
based on fostering the trade liberalisation in the region. In addition, the inclusion of Ukraine is 
not essential for the success of regional integration but Central Asian countries should be 
encouraged to follow a liberalised union. Just as the EU did in the post-war era, the Eurasian 
Economic  Union could help the members to take liberalised steps that they are unable to take 
individually. 
 
Vinokurov et. al (2017) examined monetary policy coordination among the five members of 
the EAEU and proposed three monetary regimes: (i) monetary policy reacts to inflation and, to 
a small extent, to the US Dollar; (ii) monetary policy reacts to the Russian Ruble; and (iii) 
monetary policy is based on a pegged exchange rate among the five members of the EAEU 
(Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia). The result of the research revealed 
that in three of the four smaller EAEU countries, a pegged exchange rate would increase 
macroeconomic volatility. The second regime performs well (when monetary policy reacts to 
Russian Ruble, and to inflation) in Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Overall, the results 
indicate that the EAEU is not mature enough for a fully pegged exchange rate regime.  
 
Atik (2014) argued that the regional economic integration of the EAEU is inefficient. He 
claimed that the causes of inefficiency are: (i) an inadequate convergence with the market 
economy; (ii) differences in macroeconomic structures, including income distributions, level 
of industrialisation, and balance-of-payments differences; (iii) a lack of common goals; and 
(iv) conflicts of interest across the region. 
 
Beside the points above, the Eurasian Development Bank has reported different criteria for 
integration in the region, using trade, GDP, exchange rate, and budget balance variables to 
identify levels of integration for these economies (Eurasian Economic Integration report, 
2017). However, none of these analyses have led to a concrete model that can determine the 
economic interaction of these economies with global and regional economies.   
3. Data and methodology  
 
Eurasia comprises thirteen countries according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) classification: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, the Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Geographically, this group reaches from the borders of the European 
Union to the Far East.  
 
GDP data for this study are drawn from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank 
and are expressed in logarithm form. GDP data for Afghanistan was not available prior to 2002 
and hence it is excluded from the calculations.  
 
In order to achieve the objective of the paper, I suggest that the model for regional economic 
integration should consist of three types of shocks: global output shocks; regional output 
shocks; and country-specific output shocks. Global output and regional output can be 
represented by US GDP and Chinese GDP respectively. 
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𝑥𝑡 = (𝑦𝑡
𝑔, 𝑦𝑡
𝑟 , 𝑦𝑡
𝑑) 
 
where y is the output and the superscripts g, r, and d refer to global, regional, and domestic 
shocks, respectively. The structural form of the above equation would be:  
 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐿)𝜀𝑗𝑡
𝑘  
 
where k= g, r, d and j is the supply shocks. In this paper, A is a 3 × 3 matrix that defines the 
response of endogenous variables to global, regional, and domestic shocks. Therefore the VAR 
model is represented as below: 
 
𝐴(𝐿) =  [
𝐴11(𝐿) 𝐴12(𝐿) 𝐴13(𝐿)
𝐴21(𝐿) 𝐴22(𝐿) 𝐴23(𝐿)
𝐴31(𝐿) 𝐴32(𝐿) 𝐴33(𝐿)
] 
 
However, there should be some restrictions imposed on this model in order to identify the 
matrix using the [(𝑛2 − 𝑛)/2] formula, which results in three restrictions. These restrictions 
are defined below: (i) regional and country-specific shocks have no long-run impact on global 
output; and (ii) country-specific shocks have no long-run impact on regional output, therefore 
the matrix model would be written as: 
 
  
[
∆𝑦𝑡
𝑔
∆𝑦𝑡
𝑟
∆𝑦𝑡
𝑑
] = [
𝐴11(𝐿) 0 0
𝐴21(𝐿) 𝐴22(𝐿) 0
𝐴31(𝐿) 𝐴32(𝐿) 𝐴33(𝐿)
]  × [
𝜀𝑡
𝑔
𝜀𝑡
𝑟
𝜀𝑡
𝑑
] 
 
 
Where ε is the vector of the reduced form error term. In fact the above model is the structural 
vector autoregressive model developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989).  
 
Regional shocks are important to an economy as it is assumed that neighbouring countries are 
trade partners and may have similar economic structures. External shocks have the potential to 
go beyond the regional boundaries. If global shocks can affect economies in the same way, a 
global arrangement could be a better option for dealing with global shocks than regional 
arrangements. In the case of Eurasia, if global shocks (US output) are relatively more important 
than regional shocks (Chinese output), then forming a US Dollar bloc would be a better policy 
and vice versa for a Yuan bloc (Frankel and Shang-Jin, 1994). Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1993) argued that supply shocks are more structural and less sensitive to varieties of exchange 
rate arrangement. If supply shocks are correlated across the region, then the region would be a 
candidate for common monetary arrangements. Frankel and Rose (1998) stated that with the 
rise in trade, countries are likely to face increasingly similar shocks. Therefore, supply shocks 
may become more correlated when economic integration progresses. 
 
4. Empirical results  
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The stationary properties of the time series have been examined and are identified to be 
integrated of order one, i.e., I(1) using the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests. Therefore the first-
difference form of all variables is used for estimation. For the SVAR estimation, the lag length 
is uniformly chosen to be one based on the Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC) as most of the 
equations show the lag length of one.  
 
The structural VAR model is estimated and the degree of shock symmetry among the countries 
under consideration is calculated using a correlation of identified disturbances. For this reason, 
the correlation of three structural shocks is estimated via a structural VAR model for the twelve 
Eurasian economies from 1991 to 2017, the longest possible period. It is generally assumed 
that if the correlation of shocks is positive, the shocks are considered to be symmetric, and if 
the correlation is negative or if it is insignificant, they would be classified as asymmetric.  
 
In order to find the correlation of structural shocks, structural vector autoregressive models are 
estimated and the residuals of the models are used to see the correlations. Literature (Sims, 
1980) has suggested that if the correlation is positive, the shocks are considered to be 
symmetric. And if the correlation is negative or it is insignificant, then they are asymmetric. 
Table 1 reports the correlation between domestic supply shocks in these economies. High 
correlation between supply shocks suggests that the economies are subject to symmetric shocks 
and may have further economic arrangements such as monetary coordination (Chow and Kim, 
2003). However, there are some asymmetries observed among different economies. This could 
be due to the fact that these countries are affected by different sources of variations, i.e., 
regional and global causes. In order to clarify this issue, the correlations between regional and 
domestic shocks and also between global and domestic shocks are reported in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 1: Correlation of domestic supply shocks (China as regional economy) – 1991-2017 
 ARM  AZE  BEL  GEO  KAZ  KGZ  MDA  MNG  TJK  TKM  UKR  
AZE  0,252           
BEL  -0,280 -0,097          
GEO 0,696* 0,291 -0,038         
KAZ  0,329 0,233 0,181 0,476**        
KGZ  -0,030 -0,253 0,255 0,071 0,319       
MDA  0,567* 0,036 -0,181 0,442** 0,433** 0,388***      
MNG 0.602* -0.078 -0.008 0.488** 0.399*** 0.418** 0.586*     
TJK  0,180 0,005 -0,077 0,176 0,217 0,354 0,173 0.253    
TKM  0,122 -0,095 0,261 -0,135 0,048 -0,028 -0,040 0.221 -0,542**   
UKR  0,593* -0,063 0,060 0,497** 0,636* 0,392*** 0,526** 0.625* 0,492** 0,048  
UZB  -0,067 -0,137 0,233 0,122 0,109 0,394*** 0,116 0.183 0,351 -0,151 0,252 
Note: *, **, *** denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Bold figures are representing symmetry in 
shocks.  
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Table 2: Correlation of domestic supply shocks with the regional shocks and global shocks 
(China as regional economy) 
  
1991-2017 2000-2017 
USA CHN USA CHN 
ARM  .672* .328 0.777* 0.379 
AZE  .248 .378*** 0.275 0.693* 
BEL  .404* .117 0.662* 0.524** 
GEO  .532* .424* 0.698* 0.615* 
KAZ  .172 .320 0.442*** .606* 
KGZ  -.166 -.099 -0.284 -0.362 
MDA  .152 .202 0.437*** 0.075 
MNG  .308 .112 0.522** 0.044 
TJK  -.086 .016 0.460** 0.101 
TKM  -.193 -.077 0.228 -0.203 
UKR  .265 .203 0.579** 0.371 
UZB -.120 .115 0.280 0.222 
Average  .182 .170 0.423 0.255 
Note: *, **, *** denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.   
 
Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), high correlation of domestic supply shocks and 
supply shocks to the anchor country suggests that the economies are subject to symmetric 
shocks, hence the economies are good candidates for monetary policy coordination with the 
anchor currency. Based on table above, in Eurasia, the correlation of supply shocks between 
these economies and the US is high, especially compared to correlation with Chinese supply 
shocks. Thus, according to Bayoumi and Eichengreen’s (1994) propositions, a currency area 
anchored by US is likely to be more feasible than of one anchored by China.  
 
From Table 2, it is evident that the Central Asian countries are more correlated with the Chinese 
economy and hence affected by shocks that originate from China. Although for Turkmenistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, the correlation is negative, the negative value is smaller when compared with 
the correlation for the US.  
 
Countries in the European part of the region are more correlated with the US economy. This is 
an indication that generally, the region as a whole does not provide strong evidence that it is 
ready for monetary arrangements because the economies tend to be aligned with different 
economies. But there are suggestive indications that some arrangements could be made 
between the Central Asian countries with China, and between the European countries of 
Eurasia with the US.   
7 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
A three variable structural vector autoregressive model was used to identify the impact of three 
types of shocks on the economies of Eurasia. The correlation of supply shocks within the region 
suggests some possibilities for further economic cooperation in monetary policies. In line with 
the objectives of the study to identify the impact of global shocks and regional shocks, two 
sub-regions were identified: (i) the sub-region of the Central Asian countries of Eurasia; and 
(ii) the sub-region of the European countries of Eurasia. Regional shocks are more important 
than global shocks for the Central Asian countries, and global shocks are more important than 
regional shocks in the European part of the region.  
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Appendix A: IRF from SVAR: 
Below figures are depicting the response of domestic GDPs to a unit shock from the global 
economy and the regional economy (1991-2017). The response of the shocks are inconclusive.  
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